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ABSTRACT
There is no standardised framework for digital rights management
(DRM). With the proliferation of DRM systems, there is an increas-
ing need for portability across multiple platforms and DRM sys-
tems. Current DRM systems can also be considered incomplete.
Some DRM systems are not scalable enough; some are too focused
on a particular application/file format and most do not have ade-
quate mechanisms to address all the needs of the end users of the
DRM protected works. In this paper we outline a proposal for an
open, componentized rights management framework. This frame-
work includes the architecture and a set of features that we believe
solves the requirements for a DRM system.
1. INTRODUCTION
Security of data is no longer only about access to data, but what
can be done with the data once access is granted. Encryption is
no longer enough, as there is no control on what an authorised user
does with the unencrypted data. Furthermore, with the introduction
of new laws there are now legislative requirements for corporations
and government institutions to control access to their customers’
private details. Thus there is a need to create mechanisms to control
access to data and control what authorised users can do with the
data.
Rosenblatt et al. have defined Digital Rights Management (DRM)
as “persistent protection of digital data” [24]. Currently, the main
focus of DRM systems has been fighting piracy of digital media
such as music. However the success of DRM in these endeavours
has been mixed. Critics of DRM systems have protested that these
systems give too much power to the rights holders [20, 5]. Others,
like Felten [17], have commented that legal definitions of copy-
right and fair use are too complex to ever be implemented correctly
in DRM systems. However, the success of Apple’s iTunes Music
Store [15] does show that the consumer is willing to buy DRM en-
abled music, as long as the restrictions are reasonable.
This work is supported through grants from the UCT Council, the KW
Johnstone and Daimler-Chrysler scholarships. Any opinions, findings, and
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of UCT or the trustees of
the UCT Council, KW Johnstone and Daimler-Chrysler scholarships.
Unlike the use of DRM as an anti-piracy mechanism, usage of
DRM and equivalent technologies like Content Management Sys-
tems (CMS) [11] or Enterprise Rights Management Systems (ERMS) [8]
in enterprises do not have many of the legal overheads. It is accept-
able and in many cases common practice for a corporation to define
regulations on how their property can be accessed and utilised by
their employees and sub contractors [23]. For example, most com-
panies ask their employees to sign confidentiality agreements and
have security protocols defining which employees have access to
confidential data. However, the concepts in rights management do
not differ too much from the DRM concepts for digital media.
Another problem with current DRM systems is that they are not
scalable enough to be involed in the full production cycle. For ex-
ample, in an investigation of pirated movies on the Internet, Byers
et al. discovered that the majority of the pirated copies were due to
leaks during the production of the movie and not due to members
of the public [14]. DRM is required in the full production cycle,
but the authors felt that current DRM technologies were not scal-
able, did not integrate seamlessly with the existing infrastructure
and did not support some of the complex policies required in the
production cycle.
Most of the current DRM solutions cater for specific file types and
applications. Except for Microsoft’s Right Management Services
(RMS), there are no generic platforms to create and distribute DRM
enabled data. Creation of DRM enabled data has been largely left to
the music and other media companies, and while RMS allows Mi-
crosoft Office 2003 users to enable DRM protection on their works,
the current RMS framework restricts the usage of such works to a
limited set of users1.
In this paper, we outline a proposal for an open, componentized
rights management framework. We outline an architecture and a set
of features that we believe would make an ideal DRM framework.
We believe that this framework could then be used as a standard
to enable cross platform DRM delivery. In the next section, we
outline the goals that we believe an ideal DRM system must fulfil.
2. GOALS
The use of a DRM framework is not necessarily restricted to dis-
tributing digital media (like music) or protecting sensitive docu-
ments like company financial reports. It should be possible to ex-
1RMS is discussed in more detail in section 3.4
tend the use of the DRM framework to cater for software licensing
(by using a DRM use license instead of license keys) or as a security
mechanism in shared computing environments like grid computing.
Our aim is to create a framework that
1. is scalable,
2. meets the requirements of a general rights management sys-
tem,
3. allows seamless migration between implementations of the
framework, and
4. that allows implementations to be fully portable across mul-
tiple operating systems and platforms.
Furthermore, a DRM system built using the framework must
1. be able to handle different file formats,
2. provide flexibility for different levels of security (for exam-
ple allow different encryption algorithms),
3. provide flexibility in enforcement – not all DRM works re-
quire strong enforcement2,
4. be able to handle most fair use scenarios,
5. promote user privacy and not monitor usage of DRM data,
6. allow for the transfer of rights,
7. allow for flexibility in rights implementations,
8. have a mechanism to collect revenue for rights holders if re-
quired,
9. create a secure distribution channel and
10. prevent the illegal use of DRM protected works
3. BACKGROUND
There are currently many frameworks for rights management. How-
ever, we believe that these frameworks are incomplete, and in many
cases flawed in their approaches. In this section we review a few
key frameworks that we will build upon. In section 3.1, we discuss
the roles and players in DRM systems as proposed by Bartolini
et al. in 1999. In section 3.2 we look at the secure distribution
architectures as proposed by Park et al. in 2000, following that
we have an overview of rights expression languages in section 3.3.
Finally we discuss four frameworks for rights management: Mi-
crosoft’s RMS platform, Open SDRM, Real Network’s Helix DRM
and Sidespace’s Media-S.
In section 4 we outline some of the main flaws in the DRM systems
discussed in this section. In section 5 we use the frameworks dis-
cussed in this section to build our proposed framework and outline
how our framework overcomes the flaws of the current systems.
2For instance, it can be argued that iTunes provides a weaker level
of enforcement of DRM (since a song can be written to any number
of CDs or iPods where DRM is not enforced). This is opposed to
Microsoft’s RMS which can require the user to authenticate him-
self/herself every time they wish to access protected data.
3.1 Roles and Players in a DRM System
Bartolini et al. in [11] discussed a set of roles in a content manage-
ment system. These roles were:
Author or Creator: Entity that creates the work that is right pro-
tected. The creator does not have to be human.
Rights Holder: Manages the use of the work, issues licenses, col-
lects royalties and essentially manages the work. In effect
the rights holder is the owner of the work. The rights holder
is not necessarily the creator of the work.
Service Producer: Packages the works in a security envelop to
enable rights management. The service provider can also
embed other security features such as watermarks, finger-
prints etc. into the digital work.
IPR Register/License server: Maps the rights associated with a
work to the user requesting the work.
Unique Number Issuer (UNI): Creates and manages unique iden-
tifiers for each of the DRM enabled works. The UNI could
also issue Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs), and thus cre-
ate and manage unique identifiers for all parties (creator, user,
rights holders etc) and resources (works, licenses etc) in the
DRM system.
Media Distributor/Service Provider: Responsible for distribut-
ing the work, and if required collecting fees from users. In
some of the current systems, like the Apple iTunes Music
Store, the service provider and the service producer are the
same.
Controller: A Trusted Third Party (TTP) responsible for moni-
toring of the legality of the transactions.
Certificate Authority: Another TTP responsible for authenticat-
ing the parties in a DRM transaction.
Bartolini et al. did not consider the user as a player or as having
a role in their discussion. We believe that the end user has an im-
portant role in a DRM system and thus in an earlier work [9], we
proposed the addition of the user as a player in a DRM transaction.
We also extended the roles played by the controller and the certifi-
cate authority to cover the transactions between the user and the
media distributors. Figure 1, shows all the players in current DRM
systems. However, most current DRM systems do not make use of
any TTPs.
3.2 Secure Distribution Architectures
In [21], Park et al. discusses the various security architectures
that could be used for secure content distribution. They gave three
factors that distinguished the different architectures outlined below,
and shown in figure 2
1. Virtual Machine (VM): Park et al. defined a virtual ma-
chine as “software that runs on top of [a] vulnerable
computing environment and employs control functions
to provide the means to protect and manage access and
usage of digital information” [21]. Because the VM is
Figure 1: Players in a DRM System
[9]
Figure 2: DRM Distribution Architectures
[21]
necessary to enforce the restrictions, architectures with-
out VMs are not suitable for DRM systems. Rosenblatt
has further extended the VM definition to include DRM
controllers that can be implemented at a hardware level,
or as an operating system module [23].
2. Control Sets: Control sets are the rules that govern the us-
age of a DRM protected work. These rules can be ex-
pressed using rights expression languages (discussed
further in section 3.3). Park et al. categorised control
sets into three types, fixed, embedded and external.
Fixed control sets are fixed to the VM, and are the eas-
iest to implement. However they offer the least flexi-
bility, and can become useless if they are compromised
and the VM can not be updated with a newer control
set. Embedded control sets are packaged together with
the DRM protected work. They offer more flexibility,
but changing the rules in the control set becomes more
difficult. External control sets are separate to the DRM
protected work. The biggest advantage is the ability to
address the rules of multiple works in one control set.
These control sets offer the most flexibility and also al-
low for easier change of the rules.
3. Distribution Style: Park et al. distinguished distribution pro-
cesses as either message push or external repository.
In a message push system, the data is transferred be-
tween the creator and the user by a direct communi-
cation channel (like email). In an external repository,
the user fetches the data from a central repository. Us-
ing external repositories also allow streaming data to
the user, and thus the user would not need to store the
data locally. Neither distribution has any security ad-
vantages over the other, but external repositories that
allow only streaming allow more control to the rights
holders.
All DRM systems use virtual machines, and most use a combina-
tion of fixed, embedded and external control sets. Music stores
currently use a central server approach to selling music downloads,
but Microsoft has offered the alternative of downloading the music
file from any location and then downloading a license to play the
file (i.e. an external control set architecture) with Windows Media
9 [18].
3.3 Rights Expression Languages
Rights expression languages (RELs) allow for the definition of the
constraints, permissions etc. that the rights holder gives to the user
and effectively forms the control set as defined in 3.2. In effect,
RELs allow for the expression of a usage contract between two or
more parties.
The foundations of modern RELs were laid by Marc Stefik at Xerox
Parc in the 1990s with Digital Property Rights Language (DPRL) [16].
DPRL was subsequently developed into eXtended rights Markup
Language (XrML) by ContentGuard, a company founded by Mi-
crosoft and Xerox. Other languages like Open Digital Rights Lan-
guage (ODRL) and Creative Commons (CC) have arisen to cre-
ate open rights language specifications. Most modern RELs, like
XrML and ODRL, are expressed in XML, using XML Schemas to
define the syntax and grammar of the language; enabling portability
across operating systems and platforms.
In the XrML 2.0 specifications [4], the requirements of a REL are
given as:
• Comprehensive: A language that shall be capable of ex-
pressing simple and complex rights in any stage in a
workflow, lifecycle or business model.
• Generic: A language shall be capable of describing rights
for any type of digital content or service (an ebook, a
file system, a video or a piece of software)
• Precise: a language shall communicate precise meaning to
all players in the system.
Many of the criticisms of DRM systems stem from the current in-
ability of RELs to express all the legal rights expected by the con-
sumer [17, 5]. Felten has argued that some legal rights like fair use
of copyrighted material, can never be expressed using RELs [17].
In [12] Bechtold countered that, while RELs cannot express fair
use cases in general; they can do so in individual cases. However,
as Mulligan et al. in [19] pointed out, current RELs do not have
any syntax or grammatical capabilities to express communication
between the end user and the rights holder. This limits the usage of
RELs for contract negotiations, and thus current specifications of
XrML, ODRL and other RELs are not comprehensive.
3.4 Microsoft RMS
Microsoft’s Rights Management Services (RMS) platform aims to
provide an end-to-end protection of RMS-protected data from unau-
thorised use. Unlike other DRM systems currently available, RMS
can be implemented with any application (although this is restricted
to only certain Microsoft Operating Systems) and on any data type.
The RMS package consists of a client module, a server module, and
a software development kit (SDK) for developers to create RMS
enabled applications.
Figure 3: Microsoft RMS Architecture
[7]
Figure 3 shows the components of a RMS deployment. RMS does
not make any distinction between a creator and an end user. In-
stead, there are only users of a RMS system. The user machines
requires the installation of an RMS client software, an operating
system module for Windows 98 SE and later, which effectively is
the VM as described in section 3.2. The advantage of this approach
is two fold; firstly, there is one VM for rights management instead
of one for each application; and secondly RMS can override “con-
trol+c” or “print screen” commands thus enhancing security.
The RMS Server performs the roles of the service producer3, the
unique number issuer and if required that of a certificate author-
ity. RMS utilises an active directory server as a mechanism for au-
thenticating users while the database server (currently RMS speci-
fies the use of Microsoft SQL 2000 Server) to fulfil the role of an
IPR Register as well as to perform logging of user activity. RMS
does not specify means of distribution. Furthermore, RMS does not
3Please see section 3.1 for a description of the roles in a DRM
system
make any use of an independent controller, although it can be ar-
gued that by keeping logs of every transaction, the database server
performs or provides for much of the functionalities required in a
controller.
RMS requires that all entities in a RMS transaction be a trusted
entity [6]. One RMS server needs to be enrolled with Microsoft’s
RMS Server Enrolment Server. This server can then act as the cer-
tificate authority for the enterprise. The enrolment process merely
involves signing the public key of the entities. Users are also issued
certificates (expressed in XrML) that associate users with certain
computers. RMS uses 1024-bit RSA key pairs and 128 bit AES
encryption. Licenses, rights and certificates are expressed in XrML
while communication between servers and clients is done using the
SOAP protocol.
3.5 OpenSDRM
Open and Secure Digital Rights Management Solution (Open SDRM)
is an open source project developed by the Moses4 consortium [25].
The Open SDRM project aims to create a secure framework for de-
livering multimedia on the Internet, and caters for the creation of
the secure content, payment collection, distribution and rendering
of multimedia. Figure 4 shows an overview of the Open SDRM
architecture.
Figure 4: Open SDRM Architecture
[3]
Open SDRM is highly componentized, and allows for external com-
ponents to plug in to the Open SDRM architecture. The IPMP
Tools component for example, allows for encryption, watermarking
and other related tools to be applied to the content being protected.
The Open SDRM architecture uses all the roles suggested in sec-
tion 3.1, and adds some roles that are not necessarily part of the
DRM architecture, like a payment gateway.
Unfortunately, specifications and documentation of the framework
is incomplete. For example, there is little documentation on the
4Moses: MPEG Open Security for Embedded Systems.
http://www.crl.co.uk/projects/moses/index.htm
communications protocols used between the internal modules or
how external modules interact with the internal modules. The source-
forge project site5 does not mention any implementations of the
Open SDRM framework. This makes it very difficult to evaluate
the framework.
3.6 Heilx DRM
Real Networks promoted Helix DRM as “The first multi-format
digital rights management platform for secure delivery of media to
any device”. Helix DRM is based on Real’s latest media codecs
(Helix) and is aimed at creating a secure DRM system for media
files, including streaming media. At its core, Helix DRM consists
of three components – a DRM packager to package the media file
in question; a license server for granting end users use licenses and
client software to render the media. There is also an open source
project led by Real to create “Device DRM” that can be used to
implement the DRM controller natively on hardware devices.
Figure 5: Helix DRM Architecture
[2]
There are is no documentation on Real’s website6 on the proto-
cols and processes used inside the system – just a description of
the components and their features. There is nothing that really dis-
tinguishes the DRM system from other media DRM systsems like
iTunes or Microsofts Janus Windows Media system, except for the
support for multiple file formats.
3.7 Media-S
Like Helix-DRM, Media-S is geared to be a multi-format DRM
system for delivering multimedia. Like OpenSDRM, Media-S is
an open source project. Media-S, Helix DRM and OpenSDRM
all share similar characteristics in their componentised structure;
and similarly Media-S is divided into three components – a pack-
ager, a client and a license server. However, the security mecha-
nisms trumpeted in Media-S have been criticised, with some com-
ments labelling Media-S security as virtually non-existent. While
the Media-S project does seem to be more active than OpenSDRM;
the last release of their software (Beta-2) was in April 2003. Like
OpenSDRM, this project also seems to be dead.
5http://sourceforge.net/projects/opensdrm/
6http://www.realnetworks.com/products/drm/
3.8 Summary
Our proposed DRM framework builds upon the work mentioned in
this section. The roles identified by Bartolini et al. form a crucial
role in determining the architecture of our framework. In section
4, we discuss the problems with Microsoft RMS and other current
DRM systems and then in section 5, we detail our proposed frame-
work and how it overcomes these problems.
4. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Our proposal is to create an open framework for rights manage-
ment. While RMS is the most complete rights management pack-
age available, we believe that RMS is still incomplete, and changes
are required for RMS to be a complete solution for general rights
management. Likewise, Open SDRM is an incomplete framework,
although it does feature some components that are not present in
RMS. However, Open SDRM is focused on multimedia delivery,
and is not presented as a full rights management system. The same
criticism can be directed at Helix DRM and Media-S; although in
the case of Helix, it should be possible to generalise the system to
cater for any data file. Below we detail what we believe are the
main problems in the RMS framework. Later in this section, we
also discuss some of the problems with Real Helix and Media-S.
1. User Authentication: In our opinion, the use of active di-
rectory for user authentication severely limits the func-
tionality of RMS. The major problem with the use of
active directory is that it limits RMS to be used intra-
enterprise only. Exchanging secure documents between
enterprises, or between the enterprise and the customer
requires the recipient to have an active directory ac-
count which can be a security risk; and a high overhead.
RMS does support the use of Microsoft Passport for au-
thentication also, but Passport itself has a reputation of
security failures [13] which has led to many enterprises
chosing not to use Passport for authentication. We do
believe that the use of a federated identity management
(like the federated identity schemes in the Liberty Al-
liance Project) as a basis for authentication should be
supported in our DRM system.
2. Duplicate Control Sets In RMS, the DRM protected work
has an embedded control set. However when the user
wants to access the protected work, the client is re-
quired to fetch a use license from the RMS server and
then only can the user access the work. This process
in effect makes the embedded control set useless, since
the restriction and rights can be put in the use license in
the first place.
In our opinion, a bigger problem arises should the end
user require a change in their use license. This problem
can be best represented using an example from the sec-
ond scenario in Microsoft’s overview of RMS [6]. Tom
creates a document for Jill, and protects it using RMS.
He specifies that the document can only be viewed and
edited by Jill for one week. If Jill requires additional
time, Tom is required to edit the rights to the document,
extend the deadline and then redistribute the document
to Jill. With this system; there is a high overhead in net-
work bandwidth and requires active intervention by the
rights holder/creator. This problem is increased when
dealing with large data files like video.
3. Lack of user query/feedback mechanism As mentioned above,
should a user request a change in rights; the user needs
to communicate with the rights holder/author person-
ally and then ask him/her to reissue the document with
new rights. With small documents, the overhead other
than irritation for the author/rights holder is not too
high; but with larger data files like video, there is also a
high bandwidth overhead. However it must be noted
that no current DRM system has a feedback mecha-
nism.
As discussed in section 3.3, the RELs used in current
DRM systems do not have the syntax or grammar for
bi-directional communication. In [10], we detail our
extensions to ODRL and XrML that enable bi-directional
communication between two parties. Our extensions
add syntax to ODRL and XrML that allow a user to re-
quest the rights holder to make changes to his/her cur-
rent use license. The rights holders can also respond
back to the end user granting or denying the request.
With ODRL, it should be easy to use this mechanism to
build up an offer from the rights holder where the user
has their rights to a work tailored for them personally.
4. Proprietary Solution While RMS does make use of indus-
try standards such as AES for encryption and SOAP
for messaging, the protocols used in RMS are propri-
etary. It is highly likely that computers in an enterprise
comprise of different operating systems and different
hardware architectures, and thus RMS is not a viable
solution for complete data protection.
5. Payment Gateway In fairness to Microsoft, RMS is not pro-
moted as a general DRM solution. Thus, there are no
mechanisms for payment and customer management
systems. However, in a a generic DRM system; it is
necessary to have a mechanisms to plug into the com-
pany’s EFT and customer management systems.
There are also a problems with the standardisation of clients of
all the systems described earlier. Every DRM system that is cur-
rently available require their own specific client, for example, mu-
sic bought from iTunes Music Store cannot be played on any other
applications except iTunes and the iPod. However, it must be noted
that different platforms and operating systems do require different
types of clients; since a client designed for a cell phone will have
different requirements to one designed for PC. However, we be-
lieve that it should still be possible to create a specification that
will detail the requirements for how a client should operate and
the parameters it must accept. Thus any clients that support these
requirements will then be able to inter-operate.
From the documentation provided for Media-S [?], there is no gloably
unique mechanism in identifying a DRM protected object. This
criticism can also be raised against Helix-DRM, but there is not
enough documentation to form a definite opinion. The lack of a
globally unique identity mechanism means that it could be easy
to fake the license for one DRM protected data for another; and
also has the potential to confuse the DRM client; if two different
DRM enabled data had the same identifier. This makes Media-S
unsuitable for mass deployment. Another criticism of Media-S and
Helix-DRM is the use of non-standard license RELs. Both make
use of their own REL specifications, even with the availability of
two well documented REL standards (ODRL and XrML). The use
of non-standard components make it even harder for other DRM
systems to interoperate.
5. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Figure 6 gives an overview of the structure of our proposed DRM
framework. In section 5.1, we give details on the structure of our
architecture, while in section 5.2 we highlight the underlying fea-
tures of our framework.
Figure 6: Overview of the proposed DRM Architecture
5.1 Proposed Architecture
As shown in figure 6, our architecture consists of eight different
roles. Like RMS, we do not make a distinction between an end
user and an author; and we add the role of a Payment Gateway
which was not present in the roles described in section 3.1. We
would also like to separate our proposed components into required
and optional; with the Payment Gateway, the Controller and the
Distributor being optional roles.
5.1.1 Certificate Authority [Required]
The certificate authority (CA) is a TTP that will be used to authen-
ticate the keys of the parties involved in the DRM transaction. We
propose the use of ITU-T X.509 standard for certificates; and thus
enable any of the established certificate authorities (like Thawte
and Verisign) to be CA’s in the framework. Alternatively, PGP can
also be used as the certificate standard, and the CA can be regarded
as a trusted party with very high integrity.
5.1.2 UNI [Required]
The Unique Number Issuer (UNI) will be responsible for manag-
ing unique identifiers for every DRM enabled work. The identifiers
should be globally unique, and as such one UNI should be able to
serve a number of service producers. The Digital Object Identi-
fier (DOI) has been promoted as a mechanism to uniquely identify
intelectual property [1] and DRM protected data [22]. However,
the DOI is not a secure mechanism because there is no mechanism
to verify whether an object and the given identifier belong to each
other. But the underlying handle mechanism does have a lot of ad-
vantages. Our current proposal is to make use of an adapted handle
service that will be secure enough for use in a DRM system.
5.1.3 Service Producer [Required]
The service producer packages the work in a security envelope, to-
gether with the unique identifier from the UNI and creates a tem-
plate for the rights that can be granted to an end user. The service
producer and the author can be the same; but there could be situa-
tions where a separate service producer is desired (e.g. the rights
holder of the work is not the same as the author). Should the ser-
vice producer and the author be different machines; communication
should be over a secure connection like SSL.
5.1.4 License Server [Required]
The license server serves two functions in our framework. Firstly,
the license server hands out use licenses to the end user. The use
licenses specify the rights that the user has on a DRM protected
work. Should it be required, the license server can make use of the
Payment Gateway for the end user to pay for the rights.
The second function of the license server is to handle requests from
users for additional rights (see section 5.2.5 for more details on the
request system). Some of these requests could be granted automat-
ically (for free or for a price) which can be predetermined by the
rights holder. The rights holder could also setup a set of requests
to deny automatically. Otherwise the license server should com-
municate with the rights holder the requests from the end user; and
the rights holder can then communicate back with the license server
granting or denying the request. The use of a request system should
allow for a work around for fair use; which is difficult to express in
a REL. The control set is described in more detail in section 5.2.4
5.1.5 User [Required]
The user performs two of the roles mentioned in section 3.1 - the
author and the end user. As an author, the user uses the service
producer to create a DRM protected work. The user can then make
use of a distributor (see section 5.1.6) or can distribute the work
on his/her own. The author will also require a mechanism to re-
ceive requests from end users (forwarded by the license server) and
respond to these requests.
As an end user, the user retrieves use licenses from License Server
and then can use the DRM protected work as defined by the li-
cense. As mentioned before, the user would require a mechanism
to request changes with the license server. A key component of the
end user is the VM, and this is discussed in more detail in section
5.2.1.
5.1.6 Distributor [Optional]
A DRM protected work is required to have persistent protection
regardless of where the work resides. For this reason, the distrib-
utor is not a requirement for the system, as DRM protection must
work if the work is transferred over peer-to-peer networks, made
available for download on the Internet etc. However the distributor
does provide some interesting possibilities for DRM enabled work
distribution.
5.1.7 Payment Gateway [Optional]
Like the Distributor, the Payment Gateway is an optional compo-
nent. The Payment Gateway is only required where the framework
is used for delivering commercial products, such as an online store.
We are not too sure of the specifics of the EFT protocols for the
payment gateway; but we believe they should be flexible enough
to easily integrate with existing systems of the enterprise. Thus we
are more interested in defining mechanisms that would allow other
components to communicate with the payment gateway; which can
then translate the information to the relevant protocol.
5.1.8 Controller [Optional]
In [11] Bartolini et al. put the Controller as a very important com-
ponent of a DRM system. While the controller plays a very impor-
tant role in commercial DRM systems (co-incidentally none of the
current DRM system deployments use a controller), its use in an
intra-enterprise scenario is not that important. For this reason, we
have decided to cater for the Controller as an optional component
in our framework. The use of a controller does increase the over-
all overhead and this could be a major factor against the use of a
controller.
5.1.9 Logging [Configurable]
While the use of a controller is optional, the use of logs in a DRM
system is of great importance. However the use of logs has its
drawback. If used excessively, logs can be used to monitor the
usage of DRM enabled work by end users. For this reason our
framework must strike a balance between what actions should be
logged (issue of a license, revocation of a license) and what should
not be logged.
5.2 Underlying Features
In this section, we detail the underlying features of our framework.
This includes more details on the VM for implementing the DRM
controls and the control set.
5.2.1 VM Location
In the RMS platform, the VM 7 is an operating system module. In
the OpenSDRM, Helix-DRM and Media-S the VM is at the appli-
cation level and is present in the media player [25, 2, ?]. Having
a VM at an application level is less effective than at the operating
system or hardware level since developers are required to include a
VM engine for each application. However, both the use of a VM as
an operating system module or a hardware level controller has their
disadvantages. In [23] Rosenblatt contends that VM as an oper-
ating system level causes a performance hit as every I/O operation
needs to be checked if it is allowed. While such a check is faster
in hardware, hardware VMs have had an unflattering history with
DVD-CSS and are also harder to deploy en mass.
7We use the term VM as described by Park et al. [21]
In our framework, we make a distinction between the implementa-
tion of a virtual machine and the framework for managing rights.
The VM should be involved with purely the interpretation and en-
forcement of the control set. The framework should thus spec-
ify an interface which presents the VM with the DRM protected
work, the control set and related keys and certificates. Rosen-
blatt in [23] states that hardware implementations of the VM are
inevitable and thus we would like our framework to work with any
form of VM. For low powered devices such as smart phones, hard-
ware VM could lead to faster encryption and decryption, and hence
better performance.
5.2.2 User Authentication
We realise that there are various degrees of flexibility required for
end user authentication. In some instances, an online authentica-
tion is a neccessity while in other instances, end-users expect no
further communication with the license server once they have an
use licence. For offline authentication, we forsee the use of hard-
ware based authentication tokens such as tokens from the Trusted
Computing Platform as the main authentication mechanism. How-
ever current tokens are fixed to the PCs and thus provide no mo-
bility, and a more mobile solution is required. User authentication
is strongly linked to the use license, and the user also requires a
globally unique identifier.
5.2.3 REL
As pointed out in [16], XrML and ODRL (and their respective
derivatives) are currently the only general purpose RELs available.
Thus either language could be used for expressing the control set
in our framework. We are in favour of using ODRL because it al-
ready has a mechanism to describe rights that a rights holder would
be willing to offer to the end user through its offer syntax. Since
ODRL is also an open specification, it fits our purpose for an open
framework.
5.2.4 Control Set
As described in section 4, the control set structure used in RMS has
a high overhead. To overcome the overhead, we propose the use of
external control sets in most cases. The framework will allow em-
bedded control sets when the rights are the same for all cases (e.g.
a brochure that is readable by any user) and embedded control sets
must be overridden by an external control set. The use of an ex-
ternal control set also means that the distribution of the rights pro-
tected work does not necessarily need to be prescribed. However
the mechanism for encryption of the work becomes trickier.
5.2.5 Bi-directional Communication
In [10], we present extensions to XrML and ODRL that allow for
bi-directional communication. With bi-directional communication,
the end user can ask the rights holders for changes in the use li-
cense; which is presently not possible in DRM systems. Another
feature of bi-directional communication is the ability to negotiate
contracts; and thus this would allow our framework to be used for
implementing digital contracts.
Digital contracts could be used to replace the current anti-piracy
techniques such as key-codes for software distribution. Using digi-
tal certificates and licenses are not new. 4Front Technologies for in-
stance use PGP certificates for licensing Open Sound System (OSS)
drivers for various Unix flavours to end users. Combined with a
DRM VM, software licenses expressed as DRM use licenses could
be more effective than current techniques. Such implementations
would not require any additional extensions to the framework other
than the requirement that the VM be implemented at operating sys-
tem or hardware level.
6. FUTURE WORK
The first step of the project is to define the initial specifications of
the framework. This includes specifying the exact details of each
components (e.g. the format of the UNI) and the communication
protocols used between the various components. The protocols
defining the interaction with the VM will also be defined in this
stage.
Following a set of specifications, our intention is to model our
framework using a formal specification technique. This would al-
low us to test our framework for deadlocks in the communication
protocols etc. We are going to investigate modelling tools one
whether there is a tool that can check the entire model for dead-
locks, scalability etc. We will use the results of the modelling to
improve the specifications.
Once a full framework is defined and modelled, our intention is
to create an open source project to develop the major components
such as the DRM VM. We would also like to develop applications
that can demonstrate each of the components of the framework. It
should then be possible to verify whether the framework meets the
goals set out in section 2. In the discussion below, we detail why
our framework should be able to meet some of these goals.
1. Scalability: The use of components should lead to scalabil-
ity of the system
2. Portability: The open specifications would allow for the im-
plementation on multiple operating systems.
3. Rights transfer: With the use of bi-directional REL, a user
can request for a change in end user.
4. Flexibility in rights implementations: Bi-directional REL
allows for the user to request changes. The use of an
external control set allows for individual licensing op-
tions.
5. Collection of revenue: The payment gateway should facili-
tate for the collection of revenue.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced a framework that could be seen
as an ideal rights management system. We address many of the
shortcomings of current DRM system, and with the use of a bi-
directional REL allow for the possibility of granting fair use, al-
though it will not necessarily be automatic.
The framework can be easily implemented for securing documents
for any user, and not necessarily as a mechanism for selling mul-
timedia. Thus the framework can be used as a single DRM mech-
anism for any data type; distributed by anyone implementing the
full framework. This makes the framework more powerful than
existing DRM systems.
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